Historically, psychoacousticians have divided the influence of a task-irrelevant sound (a masker) on perception of a task-relevant sound (the target) into components of 1) energetic masking and 2) informational masking. In this apportionment, energetic masking is defined as that masking that can be accounted for by considering how reliably the target is represented in the auditory periphery, and how much the masker disrupts this target representation. In contrast, the term informational masking is a catchall representing any effects of the masker that could not be accounted for by energetic masking. This talk presents a framework for understanding informational masking from a neural perspective, building on both behavioral results and neuro-imaging data. In this account, informational masking is a result of bottlenecks in the neural processing of acoustic information, a problem that the brain mediates by engaging auditory attention. Auditory attention operates by modulating the representation of different auditory objects making up a particular acoustic scene, resulting in a relative enhancement of whatever object is in the attentional foreground at the expense of the representation of competing sources. Thus, most informational masking arises from failures of target formation and/or failures of target selection.
INTRODUCTION
Visual scientists often argue that attention operates on perceptual objects, formed by estimating what stimulus elements are coming from one discrete, independent source in the external world. Vision scientists have long embraced the fact that perception in the ordinary world therefore depends not just on what light is hitting the retina, but on a complex interplay between how that light information is interpreted, what perceptual objects emerge from the light mixture, and how attentional processes determine which resulting object is the focus of attention. In contrast, in the field of auditory science, there is a historical disconnect between studies of auditory perception by psychophysicists and by neuroscientists. A caricature of these two modes would paint psychophysicists as considering only how sensory limitations affect perception, ignoring anything beyond the midbrain; and neuroscientists as ignoring how information is processed in the midbrain or below, instead worrying only about how abstract information flows within the neocortex. In both fields, this state is changing rapidly. However, remnants of this divide remain, including inconsistencies in the words used to describe the same phenomena. The goal of this paper is to directly address one aspect of this disconnect. In particular, here we explore how the plethora of studies of "informational masking" can be explained by failures of either auditory object formation or auditory object selection, both of which determine how listeners can direct auditory attention.
OBJECTS AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ATTENTION
Theories of visual attention argue that objects, or estimates of properties of one physical source in the environment, are the basic unit of attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) . Unfortunately, it can be difficult to define what constitutes an auditory object. In a mixture, audible sound can contribute to either multiple objects (Whalen and Liberman, 1996; Darwin, 1995) or not contribute to any identifiable object at all (Shinn-Cunningham et al., 2007) . Listener intention and state can influence the perceived content of an object. Particularly for ambiguously structured stimuli, the perceptual organization of a scene evolves over time and/or is bistable (e.g., Cusack and Roberts, 2004; Sussman et al., 2007) . Nonetheless, many studies have identified various sound properties that influence auditory object formation (e.g., see Darwin and Carlyon, 1995) . Common energy fluctuations in sound envelope do not happen by chance; they signal that sound elements have a common source. Harmonically related sound elements are also more likely to come from the same source, as are sounds from the same location in space. Such properties support grouping of sound elements together due to their common spectrotemporal structure. Thus, though there can be ambiguity in what constitutes an object in an auditory scene, there is no doubt that scene analysis is part of how we process sound. Moreover, how objects are formed affects perception. Behavioral evidence supports the idea that once elements of sound are grouped together, the normal mode of listening is to focus on one such object at the expense of others in the scene (Vogel and Luck, 2002; Cusack et al., 2000) , consistent with visual attention theories. In other words, auditory objects are the basic unit of auditory perception, just as visual objects are the units of visual attention.
INFORMATIONAL MASKING AND ATTENTION
In psychophysics, because of the focus on sensory limitations, the catchall phrase "informational masking" was coined to refer to any limits on perceptual ability that arise even though there is sufficient information in the sensory representation of the periphery to perform a task. This definition lumps together any process that has to do with bottlenecks in processing and attention. It ignores the knowledge that attention is a critical factor in what information "gets through" to perception, and that attention operates on objects. Moreover, here we argue that nearly every study of informational masking can be thought of as a study of when selective auditory attention fails (see also Shinn-Cunningham, 2008; Shinn-Cunningham and Best, 2008) .
The idea that attention operates on auditory objects is critical for teasing apart informational masking studies. Specifically, selective auditory attention can fail if key information in the auditory stimulus is grouped with distracting information into the same object. When object formation fails in this way, both the distracting information and the target information are processed together, as one unit. This results in interference from the distracting information, directly as a result of a failure of object formation. Of course, even if the target information is perceptually segregated from distracting sounds, so that object formation supports analysis of the target, there is no guarantee that the target will become the focus of attention. For instance, most listeners have no trouble perceptually segregating two concurrent female talkers coming from the same direction. But they may select the wrong talker, paying attention to the message that is irrelevant to a task rather than to the target message.
If one takes this understanding of the roles of object formation and object selection on perception of a complex acoustic mixture, most studies of informational masking make sense. For instance, sometimes spatial separation of two talkers has a big impact on performance, and other times not. In general, though, the times that spatial separation has the greatest impact is when there are no other known features to direct auditory attention. For instance, spatial separation can have a big impact on performance when there are two male talkers competing for attention, but has a much smaller impact when there is a male talker and a female talker, and the listener knows which gender denotes the target talker. In contrast, in many studies of informational masking that used non-speech materials (e.g., much of the work of Watson and Kidd, for instance), object formation is the limiting step, causing listeners to have difficulty in rejecting distracting sound elements and focus on the target. In short, both object formation and object selection can fail. Both have been the focus of innumerable studies. Yet, in the psychoacoustic literature, both are painted with the same broad brush of arising from informational masking, as if both reflect failures of the same process. While both may be loosely ascribed to failures of selective auditory attention, they actually arise from fundamentally different limitations.
Informational masking studies often are actually studies of some combination of failures of object formation and failures of object selection. Of course, there are close interactions between attention and object formation, which complicates this picture: auditory processing is not hierarchical, with objects being formed first, independent of attention, and then selected, based only on competition between the stable objects. Instead, processing is heterarchical: object formation influences how well irrelevant information is rejected, but once even coarse selection begins, object formation may be refined by top-down knowledge of the object's makeup. Nonetheless, given the wealth of knowledge about how attention operates in the brain (in vision and in audition), understanding informational masking as arising from bottlenecks in central processing, where objects are the fundamental units that are either processed or suppressed, goes a long way towards teasing apart the mechanisms that contribute to informational masking.
